1. 16 Aug, 2018 2 commits
  2. 15 Aug, 2018 3 commits
    • Hauke Mehrtens's avatar
      openssl: update to version 1.0.2p · e11df1ea
      Hauke Mehrtens authored
      
      
      This fixes the following security problems:
       * CVE-2018-0732: Client DoS due to large DH parameter
       * CVE-2018-0737: Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
      e11df1ea
    • Hauke Mehrtens's avatar
      kernel: bump kernel 4.9 to version 4.9.120 · 033472e1
      Hauke Mehrtens authored
      
      
      The following patch was integrated upstream:
       * target/linux/generic/backport-4.9/500-ext4-fix-check-to-prevent-initializing-reserved-inod.patch
      
      This fixes tries to work around the following security problems:
       * CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
       * CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
      033472e1
    • Hauke Mehrtens's avatar
      kernel: bump kernel 4.14 to version 4.14.63 · bfc9a440
      Hauke Mehrtens authored
      
      
      The following patches were integrated upstream:
       * target/linux/ipq40xx/patches-4.14/050-0006-mtd-nand-qcom-Add-a-NULL-check-for-devm_kasprintf.patch
       * target/linux/mediatek/patches-4.14/0177-phy-phy-mtk-tphy-use-auto-instead-of-force-to-bypass.patch
      
      This fixes tries to work around the following security problems:
       * CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
       * CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
      Signed-off-by: default avatarHauke Mehrtens <hauke@hauke-m.de>
      bfc9a440
  3. 13 Aug, 2018 2 commits
  4. 12 Aug, 2018 2 commits
  5. 11 Aug, 2018 2 commits
  6. 10 Aug, 2018 5 commits
    • Luis Araneda's avatar
      tools: findutils: fix compilation with glibc 2.28 · 9866622d
      Luis Araneda authored
      
      
      Add a temporary workaround to compile with glibc 2.28
      as some constants were removed and others made private
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Araneda <luaraneda@gmail.com>
      9866622d
    • Luis Araneda's avatar
      tools: m4: fix compilation with glibc 2.28 · c448f798
      Luis Araneda authored
      
      
      Add a temporary workaround to compile with glibc 2.28
      as some constants were removed and others made private
      Signed-off-by: default avatarLuis Araneda <luaraneda@gmail.com>
      c448f798
    • Koen Vandeputte's avatar
      kernel: bump 4.14 to 4.14.62 · 67f91dfa
      Koen Vandeputte authored
      
      
      Refreshed all patches.
      
      Compile-tested on: cns3xxx, imx6, x86_64
      Runtime-tested on: cns3xxx, imx6, x86_64
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKoen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
      67f91dfa
    • Koen Vandeputte's avatar
      kernel: bump 4.9 to 4.9.119 · e4a57509
      Koen Vandeputte authored
      
      
      Refreshed all patches.
      
      Delete upstreamed patch:
      - 100-tcp-add-tcp_ooo_try_coalesce-helper.patch
      
      Compile-tested on: ar71xx
      Runtime-tested on: ar71xx
      Signed-off-by: default avatarKoen Vandeputte <koen.vandeputte@ncentric.com>
      e4a57509
    • John Crispin's avatar
      wpa_supplicant: fix CVE-2018-14526 · 433c94f2
      John Crispin authored
      Unauthenticated EAPOL-Key decryption in wpa_supplicant
      
      Published: August 8, 2018
      Identifiers:
      - CVE-2018-14526
      Latest version available from: https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/
      
      Vulnerability
      
      A vulnerability was found in how wpa_supplicant processes EAPOL-Key
      frames. It is possible for an attacker to modify the frame in a way that
      makes wpa_supplicant decrypt the Key Data field without requiring a
      valid MIC value in the frame, i.e., without the frame being
      authenticated. This has a potential issue in the case where WPA2/RSN
      style of EAPOL-Key construction is used with TKIP negotiated as the
      pairwise cipher. It should be noted that WPA2 is not supposed to be used
      with TKIP as the pairwise cipher. Instead, CCMP is expected to be used
      and with that pairwise cipher, this vulnerability is not applicable in
      practice.
      
      When TKIP is negotiated as the pairwise cipher, the EAPOL-Key Key Data
      field is encrypted using RC4. This vulnerability allows unauthenticated
      EAPOL-Key frames to be processed and due to the RC4 design, this makes
      it possible for an attacker to modify the plaintext version of the Key
      Data field with bitwise XOR operations without knowing the contents.
      This can be used to cause a denial of service attack by modifying
      GTK/IGTK on the station (without the attacker learning any of the keys)
      which would prevent the station from accepting received group-addressed
      frames. Furthermore, this might be abused by making wpa_supplicant act
      as a decryption oracle to try to recover some of the Key Data payload
      (GTK/IGTK) to get knowledge of the group encryption keys.
      
      Full recovery of the group encryption keys requires multiple attempts
      (128 connection attempts per octet) and each attempt results in
      disconnection due to a failure to complete the 4-way handshake. These
      failures can result in the AP/network getting disabled temporarily or
      even permanently (requiring user action to re-enable) which may make it
      impractical to perform the attack to recover the keys before the AP has
      already changes the group keys. By default, wpa_supplicant is enforcing
      at minimum a ten second wait time between each failed connection
      attempt, i.e., over 20 minutes waiting to recover each octet while
      hostapd AP implementation uses 10 minute default for GTK rekeying when
      using TKIP. With such timing behavior, practical attack would need large
      number of impacted stations to be trying to connect to the same AP to be
      able to recover sufficient information from the GTK to be able to
      determine the key before it gets changed.
      
      Vulnerable versions/configurations
      
      All wpa_supplicant versions.
      
      Acknowledgments
      
      Thanks to Mathy Vanhoef of the imec-DistriNet research group of KU
      Leuven for discovering and reporting this issue.
      
      Possible mitigation steps
      
      - Remove TKIP as an allowed pairwise cipher in RSN/WPA2 networks. This
      can be done also on the AP side.
      
      - Merge the following commits to wpa_supplicant and rebuild:
      
      WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data
      
      This patch is available from https://w1.fi/security/2018-1/
      
      
      
      - Update to wpa_supplicant v2.7 or newer, once available
      Signed-off-by: default avatarJohn Crispin <john@phrozen.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 19619485)
      433c94f2
  7. 09 Aug, 2018 3 commits
  8. 08 Aug, 2018 21 commits